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RESPONSE
†
 
ANIMUS THICK AND THIN: THE BROADER 
IMPACT OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION 
IN PERRY V. BROWN 
Nan D. Hunter* 
There is a concern among supporters of marriage equality, especially those 
in the legal academy, that the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Perry v. Brown1 
was too good to be true or, perhaps, too clever to be sustainable.2 Judges Rein-
hardt and Hawkins crafted a decision that struck down Proposition 83 with rea-
soning that applies only to California. All but ignoring Judge Walker’s far-
reaching trial court opinion in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, they grounded their 
analysis in an application of heightened rational basis scrutiny, derived from 
Romer v. Evans,4 that emphasized the significance of taking away an important 
right from an unpopular minority. 
The only problem with this analysis for marriage equality supporters is 
that, despite the principle that courts should resolve constitutional disputes on 
the narrowest possible grounds, the “taking away” portion of the rationale 
 
 † Responding to William N. Eskridge Jr., The Ninth Circuit’s Perry Decision and the 
Constitutional Politics of Marriage Equality, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 93 (2012). 
 * Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Graduate Programs, Georgetown Uni-
versity Law Center. 
 1. Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012). 
 2. See, e.g., David Cole, Gambling with Gay Marriage, N.Y. REV. BOOKS NYRBLOG 
(Feb. 9, 2012, 11:48 AM), http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/feb/09/gambling     
-gay-marriage/ (arguing that Perry is unlikely to evade review); Jason Mazzone, Marriage 
and the Ninth Circuit: Thumbs Down, BALKINIZATION (Feb. 7, 2012, 7:18 PM), http://balkin 
.blogspot.com/2012/02/marriage-and-ninth-circuit-thumbs-down.html (arguing that Perry is 
“dishonest and foolish”). 
 3. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5, held unconstitutional by Perry v. Brown, 2012 WL 
372713, at *29, aff’g Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 4. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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strikes some as too outcome driven and transparently invented for the goal of 
providing the Supreme Court with a plausible rationale for denying certiorari.5 
From this view, the opinion’s political strength will also be its greatest doc-
trinal weakness. 
I disagree on two counts. First, I read the opinion as being far more nu-
anced than it has been given credit for, and believe that its elaboration of the 
role of animus in judicial review is an important contribution to equal protec-
tion doctrine. Second, critics are missing a deeper point: the greatest political 
strength of the Perry opinion lies not in the short-term question of whether the 
Supreme Court will accept review, but in its contribution to the more enduring 
issue of how courts can balance their role of serving as an antimajoritarian 
check on populist retaliation against minorities while also preserving the values 
of popular constitutionalism. 
A.  Refining the Role of Animus in Equal Protection Analysis 
The fundamental point of the “taking away” aspect of the Perry decision 
is that singling out a socially disfavored group for the withdrawal of an impor-
tant right reeks of animus. This should not be a controversial claim. Considered 
together with the denigration of gay people that saturated the pro-Proposition 8 
campaign, the consequence of the “taking away” sequence of events is to trig-
ger heightened rational basis, the standard of review used by the Supreme 
Court in Romer v. Evans.6 In my view, sexual orientation ought to be consid-
ered fully suspect when it is used as a basis for differential treatment under law, 
but neither the Supreme Court nor any U.S. court of appeals has so held. 
By contrast, taking a closer look at laws infused with animus is something 
that the Supreme Court has done since 1973, when it struck down a law enacted 
to disqualify otherwise eligible “hippies” from obtaining food stamps.7 How-
ever, the Supreme Court has done so rarely and, more importantly, has 
never said that it was using this device. Indeed, how to categorize and assess 
animus has become a recurring and unresolved question in equal protection 
law. 
Justice Scalia raised the stakes on animus in his dissent in Romer, in which 
he attacked the majority opinion for adopting “the proposition that opposition 
to homosexuality is as reprehensible as racial or religious bias.”8 Scalia derided 
the Court’s suggestion that voters had “been guilty of ‘animus’ or ‘animosity’ 
toward homosexuality,”9 and characterized its “stern disapproval of ‘animosity’ 
 
 5. See sources cited supra note 2. 
 6. See, e.g., Ellen E. Halfon, A Changing Equal Protection Standard? The Supreme 
Court’s Application of a Heightened Rational Basis Test in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 921, 959 (1987). 
 7. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534, 538 (1973). 
 8. 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 9. Id. at 644 (quoting id. at 632, 634 (majority opinion)). 
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toward homosexuality” as a misreading of a “reasonable effort to preserve tra-
ditional American moral values.”10 
In Board of Trustees v. Garrett, a case that divided the Court five to four, 
the dissenting opinion argued that adverse treatment resting upon “negative at-
titudes, fear, or irrational prejudice” necessarily violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.11 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, replied that 
“[a]lthough such biases may often accompany irrational . . . discrimination, 
their presence alone does not a constitutional violation make.”12 Justices Ken-
nedy and O’Connor both joined the Rehnquist opinion, but also wrote sepa-
rately to say that “[p]rejudice . . . rises not from malice or hostile animus 
alone,” but also from thoughtlessness.13 Clearly the concept of animus marked 
highly contested ground. 
Justice O’Connor responded in her concurring opinion in Lawrence v. 
Texas, where she spelled out the analysis for why evidence of animus (pre-
sumably when not merely “prejudice”) should trigger tougher review under the 
Equal Protection Clause, even for nonsuspect classifications.14 Perry, however, 
is the first opinion with precedential weight to adopt Justice O’Connor's ap-
proach. 
When, in the next step of its logic, the Ninth Circuit applies heightened ra-
tional basis review to Proposition 8, it accepts the proposition that there might 
be a rational reason—i.e., apart from animus—for a state to limit the benefits 
linked to marriage to only those couples who might “procreate accidentally.”15 
Since same-sex couples don’t have those kinds of accidents, including them in 
the group eligible to marry would not be necessary to advance that interest. 
Thus, the court reasons, a state could rationally choose to exclude gay couples 
from marriage. 
In the California context, however, the proponents of Proposition 8 ad-
vanced no legitimate reason for taking away the right to marry and its pre-
sumed protective benefits for children from the broader group covered under a 
regime of marriage equality. Again, according to the Ninth Circuit, 
there could be a legitimate purpose in such a retrenchment; one could imagine 
that curbing state expenses could be a rational motivation (assuming that the 
absence of same-sex marriage would save state funds, which economists have 
found to be a false assumption16). 
 
 10. Id. at 651 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 634 (majority opinion)). 
 11. 531 U.S. 356, 381 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted). 
 12. Id. at 367 (majority opinion). 
 13. Id. at 374 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 14. See 539 U.S. 558, 579-85 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 15. Perry v. Brown, Nos. 10-16696, 11-16577, 2012 WL 372713, at *20-21 (9th Cir. 
Feb. 7, 2012). 
 16. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 941-42 (N.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, 
2012 WL 372713. 
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The difficulty with this part of the court’s reasoning is that the accidental 
procreation argument itself is so strained. Using marriage as a state-sanctioned 
mechanism for enhancing the likelihood that adults who have children will le-
gally bind themselves to each other and thereby—so the theory goes—provide 
a stable family dynamic for raising children is advanced as much by allowing 
gay couples to marry as allowing straight couples to marry, since as many as 31 
per cent of lesbian couples and 8 per cent of gay male couples are raising chil-
dren.17 So for the court to accept that accidental procreation is a plausible state 
interest, it has to accept that the state could have a legitimate interest in protect-
ing only the children of unplanned and unwanted pregnancies. With animus 
having triggered a heightened rational basis test, critics see the court’s crediting 
this argument as a weakness in its reasoning. 
However, if standard jurisprudential principles are applied fairly, the court 
should be allowed to postpone this issue for another day. One value of encour-
aging courts to decide cases on the narrowest possible ground is that it allows 
the allocation of rights and powers among competing social factions to evolve 
gradually. The Perry court did not have to reach the question of whether the 
accidental procreation rationale could ever make sense, so it didn’t. Beneath 
this hesitancy surely lay an understanding that profound shifts in social mean-
ing occur in slow motion; that very factor justifies minimalist adjudication.  
The bigger problem in sustaining the Reinhardt-Hawkins opinion on appeal 
comes from an entirely different factor. The strongest reason for the Supreme 
Court to grant certiorari is its tendency to review decisions that invalidate state 
laws on federal law grounds. Thus, while I think the Perry panel opinion cre-
ates the strongest basis for the Supreme Court to deny certiorari, I would give 
that result only equal odds. Ultimately, the Court’s decision on certiorari may 
well turn on how Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy resolve the tension 
between the federalism concerns that arise from striking down state laws and 
the Court’s prudence in avoiding unnecessary ventures into the heart of culture 
wars. That will, I believe, be a very tough choice. 
B. Animus and Elections 
Even if this opinion turns out not to mark the end of the Proposition 8 
drama, I think that it makes a different and arguably more far-reaching contri-
bution to understanding the role of a countermajoritarian judiciary in modern 
governance. 
Voter initiatives such as Proposition 8 are particularly likely to be infected 
with the intent to scapegoat and retaliate against minority groups. In Strauss v. 
 
 17. Christopher Carpenter & Gary J. Gates, Gay and Lesbian Partnership: Evidence 
from California, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 573, 582 tbl.2 (2008). See also Gary J. Gates, Family 
Formation and Raising Children Among Same-Sex Couples, FAMILY FOCUS ON LGBT 
FAMILIES F1 (Winter 2011), available at http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/ 
uploads/Gates-Badgett-NCFR-LGBT-Families-December-2011.pdf. 
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Horton,18 LGBT rights groups brought the first challenge to Proposition 8 in 
state court, on state constitutional grounds, using a theory focused on constitu-
tional process rather than substance. They argued unsuccessfully that eliminat-
ing the right of same-sex couples to marry constituted a fundamental alteration 
of the structure of governance because it so seriously undermined the power of 
the judicial branch (the state supreme court) to serve its proper countermajori-
tarian function as to individual rights. The California Supreme Court ruled that 
Proposition 8 amended, but did not fundamentally revise, the state constitution, 
and thus was valid. 
But the Strauss decision left unresolved a deeper question of whether 
popular majorities should be able to strip constitutional protections from mi-
norities. Because the Strauss plaintiffs wanted to insulate their challenge 
against Supreme Court review, they did not raise, and the state court thus did 
not rule on, the issue of whether Proposition 8 violated the federal Constitution. 
Ignoring the pleas of the advocacy organizations, a group of gay and pro-
gay individuals then filed the Perry case in federal court, arguing that Proposi-
tion 8 violated the liberty and equality rights of same-sex couples under the 
U.S. Constitution. This challenge focused on substantive individual-rights 
claims, and raised no process issues as to the validity more generally of voter 
initiatives that selectively target minority groups. Thus, for strategic reasons, 
the various litigants framed their challenges to Proposition 8 as either exclu-
sively about process under the state constitution (Strauss) or exclusively about 
substantive liberty under the federal Constitution (Perry). 
The Ninth Circuit opinion, albeit indirectly, applies federal constitutional 
analysis to the question of whether unchecked majoritarianism as exemplified 
by Proposition 8 must be accepted as legitimate in a constitutional democracy. 
The decision proffers a limited but nonetheless helpful antidote to the most 
egregious kind of populist smackdown of unpopular rights. It creates a barrier 
to using elections to eliminate protections that have been adopted through the 
mechanisms of deliberative democracy and that seek to rectify a clear historical 
pattern of discrimination. Hence, again, we see the relevance of animus. 
Under the analysis in Perry, such a vote may or may not be constitutional, 
depending on a series of factors. The determination will turn on whether the re-
traction had a demonstrably legitimate purpose, one other than simply stigma 
and status denigration. The evidence relevant to that inquiry would not be a 
contest over the moral worth of the social group in question, such as was im-
plicit in the trial record in Perry. Instead, a trial court’s inquiry would be di-
rected toward the framing of the issue, the text of the question put to voters and 
of the state’s official explanation, and the primary campaign materials relied on 
to persuade voters to adopt it, all factors that Judges Reinhardt and Hawkins 
cited extensively in their opinion. 
 
 18. 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). 
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What would be the practical and productive result of such an approach to 
assessing the constitutionality of voter initiatives? One effect would surely be 
that the proponents of this kind of constitutional amendment would curtail the 
opprobrium quotient of their proposal and their rhetoric. To withstand a post-
election challenge, they will likely try to link more carefully their initiatives to 
noninvidious goals. 
In that way, adopting the mechanism suggested in Perry would encourage 
self-policing of some of the most hateful sorts of anti-civil rights campaigns. It 
would not, and consistent with the First Amendment should not, eliminate big-
oted arguments in the public sphere. But the knowledge that the judiciary 
would serve as a check against the darker impulses of human nature might mit-
igate the worst of them. 
A second indirect effect would be to provide a bit of shelter to state-court 
justices who understand that rulings benefiting unpopular minorities will al-
most certainly elicit backlash. In some jurisdictions, the state constitution re-
quires both legislative and electoral votes before overturning such a decision by 
state constitutional amendment,19 and in those states, that process serves the 
same kind of deliberation-producing effect that the promise of retroactive re-
view would provide. In other situations, backlash can take the form of targeting 
individual judges who face retention elections,20 a device that would be unaf-
fected by the Perry analysis.  
Thus, although initially the panel opinion in Perry would affect only Prop-
osition 8, its larger contribution may be the creative way that it addresses the 
persistent, intractable conundrum of America’s countermajoritarian difficulty. 
The opinion does this in part by taking animus seriously as one of the criteria 
for heightened rational basis review and in part by creating a modest curb on 
popularly enacted state constitutional amendments. If the Ninth Circuit grants 
rehearing en banc, the opinion will be vacated, but one hopes that its contribu-
tion to the evolution of equal protection law will endure. 
 
 19. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. IV, §§ 4-5 (requiring two successive legis-
lative votes of at least twenty-five percent of members and a popular vote). 
 20. Three members of the Iowa Supreme Court who joined the opinion striking down 
that state’s exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 
(Iowa 2009), were turned out by voters in the state’s 2010 judicial election. Patrick Caldwell, 
Disorder in the Court, AM. PROSPECT, Oct. 2011, at 44, 45, available at http://prospect.org/ 
article/disorder-court. 
